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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EXEMPLARY AWARD
ISSUE IN AVIATION LITIGATION
DANIEL DONNELLY*
HE GENERAL issue of exemplary awards1 today is an arena
of escalating debate,' significant not only because of its poten-
tially devastating impact on defendants and insurers, but more
importantly, because it is so inextricably intertwined with the larger
issue of liability with fault (or no fault).' It is a battlefront in-
volving skirmishes not only between the plaintiff and the defense
bar, but between the insurer disclaiming and the insured claiming
coverage.
In recent years the impact on aviation litigation has been pro-
nounced,' and the indicators are that the trend toward such claims
* J.D., 1960, Fordham Law School. Mr. Donnelly is the former Assistant
U.S. Attorney General, Southern District of New York, and is a member of the
A.B.A. Committee on Aeronautical Law. Mr. Donnelly is former Chairman,
Aeronautics Committee of the Federal Bar Council.
1 In this paper the terms "punitive damages," "exemplary damages," "vindic-
tive damages" will not be utilized except when material using such misnomers is
quoted. The author of this article will eschew such terms because (with minor
exceptions discussed in the text) such awards are not "damages" as that term is
generally recognized, that is, to compensate for some loss. Moreover, the term
"exemplary" will be used to characterize the award inasmuch as exemplary best
connotes the primary and soundest rationale underlying the award, that is, de-
terrence of the defendant tort-feasor and similarly situated potential tort-feasors.
2 See, e.g., Lambert, Commercial Litigation-The Case for Punitive Damages
(Including their Coverage by Liability Insurance), 35 ATLA L. J. 164 (1974);
Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: an Annotated Argumentative Out-
line, 11 FORUM 57 (1975); Ghiardi, The Case Against Punitive Damages, 8
FORUM 411 (1972).
3 It has been noted that the long-term consequences of judicial failure "to
equitably balance the interest of the consumer with that of the manufacturer will
result in either protective legislation (that is, restrictive to the consumer) to in-
sure needed technological and economic progress, or will result in drastic changes
in the entire adversary system of compensation for product-induced injuries that
would not be in the consuming public's interest." Haskell, The Aircraft Manu-
facturer's Liability for Design and Punitive Damages-The Insurance Policy and
The Public Policy, 40 J. AIR L. & CoM. 595, 612-13 (1974).
'See, e.g., Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr.
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and awards will increase! This trend is especially ominous for the
operators and manufacturers of the so-called "jumbo" aircraft and
those aviation manufacturers whose questionable design and manu-
facture have found their way into hundreds and, in some cases,
thousands of aircraft which are being scrutinized by an increas-
ingly sophisticated plaintiffs' aviation trial bar.
The trend toward seeking such awards has its genesis both in
motives pure and not so pure, depending on which critic speaks.
The plaintiffs' bar quite properly points to the Federal Aviation
Administration's apparent inability to effectively scrutinize large
segments of the aviation industry and the industry's inability to
police itself. Plaintiffs' counsel observe that claims for exemplary
awards originate frequently as a reaction to defense counsels' in-
transigent resistance to realistically evaluating meritorious claims
and expeditiously disposing of them to the benefit, not only of
plaintiffs, but defense counsels' clients who continually subsidize
unwarranted and lengthy litigious excursions. Plaintiffs' counsel
point out that such excursions, even when successful, cost the
client more than would have been needed to buy peace with the
plaintiff in the first place.
On the other hand, plaintiffs' counsel are castigated for their
avarice and their attempts to force settlements for compensatory
damages by utilizing the wedge of claims for exemplary awards.
These ascribed motives emerge in legal literature as debates con-
cerning whether the historical antecedents for exemplary awards
and the rationale underlying such awards justify the doctrine's
continued existence; whether the doctrine is constitutional; whether
it ought to be applied to employers based solely on respondeat su-
perior; or whether public policy forbids or allows idemnification
for such claims through insurance and myriad other issues.
Not unmindful of the human factors which may contribute to
416 (1974) (A jury awarded punitive damages totaling $17,250,000.00. This
award was set aside, not on the grounds that the conduct of Beech did not war-
rant the imposition of this payment, but on the grounds that section 377 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure [a wrongful death statute] precluded an
award of punitive damages and that section 573 of the California Probate Code
[a survival statute] allowed the recovery of punitive damages only where the de-
cedent had survived the destruction of his personal property, which had not oc-
curred in the Pease case.)
' See, e.g., Stencil Aero Engineering Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 3d
978, 128 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1976).
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this controversy, let us examine some of these arguments. This
examination will lead to the conclusion that exemplary awards are
here to stay and have a place in our civil law of torts, albeit not
without modification.
I. THE GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF
EXEMPLARY AWARDS AND THE DOCTRINE'S
UNDERLYING RATIONALE
The doctrine of exemplary awards has received almost universal
acceptance 6 either as a doctrine of the common law' or as a creature
of legislative resolve Despite its detractors, the doctrine has been
6 The common law in the following jurisdictions, however, does not recognize
the doctrine of exemplary awards: Louisiana-Fassitt v. United T.V. Rental, Inc.,
297 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 1974); Boutte v. Hargrove, 277 So. 2d 757 (La. App.
1973) (Under Louisiana law, however, compensatory damages may include
awards for mental anguish and embarrassment caused by the intentional violation
of property rights, even if the violation causes no pecuniary damage. Loeblich v.
Gamier, 113 So. 2d 95 (La. App. 1959)); Massachusetts-Caperci v. Huntoon,
397 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); City of Lowell
v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 47 N.E.2d 265 (1943);
Nebraska-Miller v. Kingsley, 194 Neb. 123, 230 N.W.2d 472 (1975); Abel v.
Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684 (1960); New Hampshire-Vratsenes
v. N.H. Auto, Inc., 289 A.2d 66 (N.H. 1972); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342
(1873) (However, under New Hampshire law "when the act involved is wanton,
malicious, or oppressive, the compensatory damages awarded may reflect the
aggravating circumstances. . . . In fixing the amount of damages consideration
is to be given to the result of the act itself, and the circumstances surrounding
it, among which are motive and the presence or absence of provocation." Vrat-
senes v. N.H. Auto, Inc., 289 A.2d 66, 68 (1972)); Puerto Rico-Ganapolsky
v. Park Gardens Development Corp., 439 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1971); Santos v.
Rossi, 64 P.R.R. 683 (P.R. 1945); Washington-Steele v. Johnson, 458 P.2d 889
(Wash. 1969); Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. Prods., 73 Wash. 2d 23, 436 P.2d 186
(1968).
7 An enlightening dissertation on the origin and development of the doctrine
can be found in Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173
(1931). Its origin may have been biblical since in the 21st Chapter of Exodus,
37th verse, we read "when a man steals an ox or a sheep, and slaughters or sells
it, he shall restore five oxen for the one ox and four sheep for the one sheep."
Its judicial origins seem to trace back to the mid-eighteenth century to Huckle
v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763). According to Sedgwick,
the doctrine, as such, arose with the practice of charging juries they might award
damages in excess of actual damages to punish defendants and to deter others
of like mind as the defendant, even though juries, in fact, already had been doing
that on their own. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES §
348 et seq. (9th ed. 1912). See also Hodel, The Doctrine of Exemplary Damages
in Oregon, 44 ORE. L. REV. 175, 177-78 (1965). Note, Exemplary Damages in
the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1957).
aSee, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3, § 3294 (1905); COLO. REV. STAT.
13-21-102 (1963); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 28:1-106 (1963); GA. CODE ANN. §$
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aptly recognized as "a worthy legacy of our common law"' and
its salubrious function in modem jurisprudence acknowledged."
Like any doctrine of the common law, it has its origins in history"
but is not dependent on its historical antecedents for its present
justification.
The doctrine of exemplary awards relies not on any single ra-
tionale. Indeed, it has been observed that the doctrine is "like the
chameleon, changing hue and color against the different backdrops
of varying legal issues."1 The doctrine has been viewed as one of
punishment, punishment and deterrence, " and deterrence alone."
105-2002 (1968); KAN. STAT. SS 84-1-107 (1966); KEN. REV. STAT. S 454.040
(1970); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 229 S 2 (1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
17-208 (1921); NEV. REV. STAT. tit. 3, ch. 42.010 (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE 5
32-03-07 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 S 9 (1910); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 21-3-2 (1974).
9'Herald Company v. Harper, 410 F.2d 125, 128 (8th Cir. 1969).
10 "In nearly all states punitive damages are recognized to be recoverable. They
are no longer looked upon as monstrous, but are awarded to vindicate wrongs
arising from antisocial behavior." Campbell v. Government Employees Ins. Co.,
306 So. 2d 525, 531 (Fla. 1975).
11 See note 7 supra.
"Anderson, Indemnity against Punitive Damages: An Examination of Punitive
Damages, Their Purpose, Public Policy and the Coverage Provisions of the Texas
Standard Automobile Liability Insurance Policy, 27 Sw. L.J. 593, 623 (1973).
1"J. C. Penney Co. v. O'Daniell, 263 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1959); Walczak v.
Healey, 280 A.2d 728 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Galindo v. Western States Collec-
tion Co., 82 N.M. 149, 477 P.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1970); Woody v. Catawba Valley
Broadcasting Co., 272 N.C. 459, 158 S.E.2d 578 (1968); Courtesy Pontiac, Inc.
v. Ragsdale, 532 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975).
'"Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974) (42 U.S.C. § 1983-Civil
Rights Act); Trahan v. Cook, 288 Ala. 704, 265 So. 2d 125 (1972); W. R.
Skousen Contractors, Inc. v. Chatter, 24 Ariz. App. 153, 236 P.2d 722 (Ct. App.
1975); Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 251 Ark. 1036, 479 S.W.2d 518 (1972); Es-
parza v. Specht, 55 Cal. App. 3d 1, 127 Cal. Rptr. 493 (Ct. App. 1976); Short
v. Downs, 537 P.2d 754 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Harris v. Wagshal, 343 A.2d 283
(D.C. Ct. App. 1975); Lan-Chile Airlines, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 296 So. 2d 498
(Fla. Ct. App. 1974); Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 496 P.2d 939 (1972);
Fopay v. Noveroske, 31 Ill. App. 3d 182, 334 N.E.2d 79 (1975); Capitol Dodge,
Inc. v. Haley, 288 N.E.2d 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Grefe v. Ross, 231 N.W.2d
863 (Iowa 1975); Sweaney v. United Loan and Finance Co., 205 Kan. 66, 468
P.2d 124 (1970); Bisset v. Goss, 481 S.W.2d 71 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972); Cheek v.
J.G.B. Properties, Inc., 28 Md. App. 29, 344 A.2d 180 (1975); Fowler Butane
Gas Co. v. Varner, 244 Miss. 130, 141 So. 2d 226 (1962); Price v. Ford Motor
Credit CO., 530 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Spackman v. Ralph M. Par-
sons Co., 147 Mont. 500, 414 P.2d 918 (1966); Caple v. Raynel Campers, Inc.,
90 Nev. 341, 526 P.2d 334 (1974); Belinski v. Goodman, 139 N.J. Super. 351,
354 A.2d 92 (1976); Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 179
N.E.2d 497 (1961); Curry v. Big Bears Store Co., 75 Abs. 148, 142 N.E.2d
684 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pleas 1956); Oller v. Hicks, 441 P.2d 356 (Okla. 1968);
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As a doctrine of deterrence, it is not only the defendant-tort-
feasor whom the exemplary award seeks to inhibit from tortious
conduct but als6 other potential tort-feasors. 8 Some courts view
the doctrine as one of revenge vindicating the rights of the injured
party" and others as providing an inducement to bring suit against
antisocial conduct;"' still others view it as rewarding an individual
for public service in bringing a wrongdoer to account."' A small
minority of jurisdictions have apparently rejected any justification
for the doctrine apart from its affording a means of compensating
a victim over and above actual damages caused by conduct more
aggravated than ordinary negligence above.2"
Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (1970); Harris v. Burnside,
261 S.C. 163, 199 S.E.2d 65 (1973); Herstein v. Kemker, 19 Tenn. App. 681,
94 S.W.2d 76 (1936); Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975); Calero v.
Del. Chemical Corp., 228 N.W.2d 737 (Wisc. 1975); Waters v. Brand, 497
P.2d 875 (Wyo. 1972).
1Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961)
(49 U.S.C. § 1374(b)(1970)); Davis v. Schuchaf, 510 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Pearce, 121 Ga. App. 835, 175 S.E.2d
910 (1970); Credit Plan Corp. of Houston v. Gentry, 516 S.W.2d 471 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1974); Herman v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 524 F.2d
767 (3d Cir. 1975).
"Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 251 Ark. 1036, 479 S.W.2d 518 (1972); Walker
v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 179 N.E.2d 497 (1961); Trainor
v. Deters, 22 Ohio App. 2d 135, 259 N.E.2d 131 (1969); Giant of Virginia, Inc.
v. Pigg, 207 Va. 679, 152 S.E.2d 271 (1967).
17 Adams v. Hunter, 343 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.S.C. 1972); Wills v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
11 Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 496 P.2d 939 (1972); Walker v. Shel-
don, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 179 N.E.2d 497 (1961).
19 Fowler Butane Gas Co. v. Varner, 244 Miss. 130, 141 So. 2d 226 (1962).
10 Lanese v. Carlson, 32 Conn. Sup. 163, 344 A.2d 361 (Super. Ct. 1975);
Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967); Op-
penhuizen v. Wennersten, 2 Mich. App. 288, 139 N.W.2d 765 (1966); McFadden
v. Tate, 350 Mich. 84, 85 N.W.2d 181 (1957); Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456
(1876). Many jurisdictions have expressly rejected compensation as the rationale
justifying such awards. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Collins, 23 Ariz. App. 54, 530 P.2d
900 (1975); Walczak v. Healey, 280 A.2d 728 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Capitol
Dodge, Inc. v. Haley, 288 N.E.2d 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Grefe v. Ross, 231
N.W.2d 863 (Iowa 1975); Brewer v. Home-Stake Production Co., 200 Kan. 96,
434 P.2d 828 (1967); Belinski v. Goodman, 139 N.J. Super. 351, 354 A.2d 92
(1976). Those jurisdictions which view the rationale for such awards as com-
pensation do so to reimburse the plaintiff for certain legally non-compensable
elements. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1873); Earl v. Tupper, 45 Vt. 275 (1873).
In regard to the concept of compensation being the rationale for these awards,
it has been observed that many of the earlier forms of compensatory damages
which were not recognized in common law are now recoverable as actual dam-
ages (e.g., mental anguish). Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Pearce, 121 Ga.
App. 835, 175 S.E.2d 910 (1970). Therefore, even in those jurisdictions which
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In virtually every instance exemplary awards punish, deter, vin-
dicate, revenge, reward, compensate and provide an inducement
to move against anti-social conduct. The doctrine's underlying
justification is best viewed, however, from the standpoint of the
tort-feasor or prospective tort-feasor, and, as such, should be
limited to punishment and through punishment, or the spectre of
punishment, to deterrence. Vindication, revenge, reward and com-
pensation are not justifications for the doctrine but are benefits
devolving to the victim from the doctrine's application.
In addressing one's self to the viability of the doctrine of ex-
emplary awards, one must examine the rationale justifying the
doctrine and not apply the litmus paper to the collateral benefits
the victim may receive from the doctrine's application. Inasmuch
as criticisms of the doctrine directed at the benefits the victim
derives (such as vindication," revenge,"' reward, compensation or
"a windfall"") fail to tackle the rationale which justifies the doc-
view compensation as a rationale for punitive damages, it must be recognized
that this theory offers no compelling justification for such awards. Ghiardi,
The Case Against Punitive Damages, 8 FORUM 411, 412 (1972). At best, this
criticism is only partially well-founded. An incisive dissection of the compensatory
rationale may be found in Hodel, The Doctrine of Exemplary Damages in Ore-
gon, 44 ORE. L. REV. 175, 178-79 (1965) wherein it was observed that "if com-
pensation for such expenses is desirable, it would be more appropriate simply
to recognize them as proper items for compensatory damages." Id. at 178.
2 Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517
(1957). This article recognized that justification for the doctrine lay not in its
vindicative function but in its function of punishment and deterrence: 'The com-
pensatory and vindictive functions seem insufficient in themselves to justify the
continued existence of exemplary damages; the jutification must be sought in the
functions of punishment and deterrence." Id. at 522.
"Hodel, The Doctrine of Exemplary Damages in Oregon, 44 ORE. L. REV.
175, 179 (1965). Although revenge is not an appropriate rational justifying the
existence of the doctrine, judicial control of the means of revenge, a human emo-
tion which may loom large in a given case, is clearly desirable. Therefore, it has
been observed that "punitive damages have helped to maintain the public tran-
quility by permitting the wronged plaintiff to take his revenge in the courtroom
and not by self-help." Campbell v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d
525, 531 (Fla. 1975). It has also been stated that "a modern legal system can
hardly be based on revenge, but insofar as self-help is discouraged by satisfying
a plaintiff's vindictive spirit a useful purpose is served by awarding exemplary
damages." Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV.
517, 522 (1957).
'
3 Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should be Abolished, DE-
FENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE MONOGRAPH: THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES
4, 8 (1969). Would that the criticism of the doctrine were always so benign. The
criticism has frequently been intemperate ("a monstrous heresy . . . an un-
healthy excrescense, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law.") Fay v.
Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873); intellectually hysterical
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trine, they have little value in any meaningful debate of the doc-
trine's viability. In any event, in a case involving the crash of an
aircraft with its accompanying tragic aftermath, vindication of the
rights of the injured party and revenge tend to be minimal factors
from the viewpoint of the victims or those left to grieve.
The punishment-deterrence rationale is particularly appropriate
in those aviation cases where the conduct of the tort-feasor has
gone beyond mere negligence " and involves a calculated decision
("Those who benefit from a government error in a check or in a
government bond, for amounts larger than are proper, are not en-
titled to any ill-gotten gains; and if there is resistance of any kind,
they are in custody. The farmer who would cash a check errone-
ously issued to him for an amount beyond his proper loan would
find the Federal Bureau of Investigation breathing down his neck,
and he would settle up without the necessity of any legal action.
• . .But, insofar as exemplary damages are concerned, there is a
Robin Hood attitude on the part of the courts and juries that should
be discarded.")
Mooney, A Proposal to Abolish Exemplary, Punitive and Vindictive Damages,
INS. L.J. 254 (1961); myopic ("The doctrine of punitive damages is a vestige
of the past'which has no logical place in modern tort law.") Duffy, Punitive
Damages: A Doctrine Which Should be Abolished, DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
MONOGRAPH: THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 3 (1969); and invidiously
simplistic ("Air carriers and manufacturers are closely regulated by governmental
authorities and are thus already exposed to civil administrative penalties as well
as criminal penalties. The stacking of civil penalties is unlikely to serve any fur-
ther legitimate function .. ") Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: an
Annotated Argumentative Outline, 11 FORUM 57, 60 (1975).
24 It has been observed by one text writer that, as a general rule, in non-
intentional tort cases, exemplary awards may be made where a tort-feasor has
displayed a reckless indifference to the .potentially harmful consequences of his
conduct, Note, 70 HARv. L. REv. 517 (1957), and by another that such an award
is warranted where there has been "a conscious or knowing indifference to an
obvious risk of injury," Franson, J., Exemplary Damages in Vehicle Accident
Cases, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 93, 94 (1975). In addressing themselves as to what con-
duct warrants the imposition of the yoke of an exemplary award, a sampling
of courts have spoken as follows: "reckless indifference to the rights of others,"
Scott v. Curtis, 186 A.2d 403 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962); "reckless disregard of the
rights of others," W. R. Skousen Contractors, Inc. v. Chatter, 24 Ariz. App.
153, 155, 536 P.2d 722, 726 (1975); Testerman v. H & R Block, Inc., 324 A.2d
145, 161-62 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975); "wanton and reckless disregard of plain-
tiff's rights and feelings," Short v. Downs, 537 P.2d 754, 759 (Colo. App. 1975);
"without regard to the rights of the plaintiffs," Soucy v. Greyhound Corp., 27
App. Div. 2d 112, 114, 276 N.Y.S.2d 173, 175 (1967); "reckless disregard of
the safety of others," Adams v. Hunter, 343 F. Supp. 1284, 1291 (D.S.C. 1972);
"reckless indifference to the interests of others," Focht v. Rabada, 268 A.2d 157,
160 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1970); "reckless, wilful or wanton conduct," Jeffers v. Harde-
man, 231 S.C. 578, 580, 99 S.E.2d 402, 404 (1957); "conscious disregard of
the rights of others," Giant of Virginia, Inc. v. Pigg, 152 S.E.2d 271, 277 (Va.
1967); "conscious indifference to the consequences on the part of the defendant,"
Honaker v. Leonard, 325 F. Supp. 212, 213-14 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); "a conscious
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on the part of the tort-feasor to indulge in a course of conduct to
achieve a profit or avoid or minimize an otherwise certain loss at
the expense of the safety of others. Such conduct occurs when,
for instance, an air carrier continues to operate aircraft into a high
revenue producing airport when the capability of the airport to
continuously accept such aircraft safely is compromised by inade-
quate runways or approach aids. Such conduct also occurs when
a manufacturer allows its aircraft or component to continue in use
after it has discovered a serious defect, carrying with it the potential
for disaster, which would involve the manufacturer in a costly
modification or retrofitting program.'5
The argument that the deterrence rationale for exemplary
awards is not valid because prospective tort-feasors probably are
unaware of the existence of the doctrine' has little merit in an
aviation case. Most segments of the aviation industry are aware
of the potential impact of the doctrine on their conduct; that a
small segment may be nescient of the doctrine does not warrant
its abolition but, more appropriately, highlights the obligation of
insurers and counsel to educate their insureds and clients. Certainly
little of a constructive nature is achieved by keeping them in the
dark.
While it is true that deterrence may be achieved through punish-
ment and that punishment has traditionally been the province of
penal law, it cannot be said that exemplary awards, to the extent
indifference to the right or welfare of the persons" to be affected by it, FWA
Drilling Co. v. Lambert, 418 S.W.2d 878, 883 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967);
"wanton misconduct," Badgett v. McDonald, 304 So. 2d 228, 229 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1974); "deliberate act or omission with knowledge of a high degree of
probability of harm and reckless indifference to consequences," Berg v. Reaction
Motors Div., Thioko Chemical Corp., 181 A.2d 487, 496 (N.J. 1962). Conduct
which may not warrant the imposition of an exemplary award because only ordi-
nary care was required of a tort-feasor may, however, warrant such an award
against another tort-feasor where the degree of care required is higher-for exam-
ple, in the case of an air carrier. Cf., Soucy v. Greyhound Corp., 27 App. Div. 2d
112, 276 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1976).
25 For a discussion of the justification of exemplary awards in such circum-
stances, see Hodel, The Doctrine of Exemplary Damages in Oregon, 44 ORE. L.
REV. 175, 183-84 (1965).
"6 It has been observed that the "rationalization of deterrence is strictly a fic-
tion. Few persons have any knowledge and understanding of what punitive dam-
ages are, yet they are quite aware of criminal sanctions against acts for which
they also could be held liable in punitive damages." Duffy, Punitive Damages,
A Doctrine Which Should be Abolished, DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE MONO-
GRAPH: THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 4, 11 (1969).
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that they use punishment as a means to achieve deterrence, have
no place in the civil law which, by tradition, is oriented to com-
pensating victims." Compensatory damages, after all, are awarded
in a punitive manner; that is, it is the tort-feasor and no other who
is singled out to make the victim whole. Moreover, the obligation
to pay compensatory damages arises only after the tort-feasor has
been shown to be at fault. The civil law, then, while its function is
compensatory, utilizes means which involve the imposition of
punishment on the tort-feasor.
It has been aptly observed in this regard that:
the argument that tort law is intended solely to recompense the
injured plaintiff does not explain why compensation is at the ex-
pense of the defendant rather than at the expense of the public
treasury or a system of insurance. The argument of compensation
explains what the plaintiff in a tort action receives. It does not
explain why the defendant pays. The compensatory theory of tort
law also fails to explain why a plaintiff injured through the 'fault'
of a defendant is compensated while other plaintiffs are not."
Even were punishment and deterrence traditionally the sole
prerogatives of the criminal law (which they are not), the civil
law should be sufficiently dynamic to punish when the criminal law
fails to because a statute does not exist or the prosecutor does not
27 Such argument has been made. In referring to the punishment rationale for
exemplary awards, it has been urged:
This argument is directly contrary to the long history of juris-
prudence which has never failed to recognize the separate and dis-
tinct natures of criminal and civil jurisprudence. The punishment
of a wrongdoer has traditionally been a function of criminal law,
and nowhere else has a criminal law concept such as punishment
been allowed to enter tort law.
Id. at 9. See also Ghiardi, The Case Against Punitive Damages, 8 FORUM 411,
418 (1972); Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119 (1884); Fay v. Parker,
53 N.H. 342 (1873).
28Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517,
523 (1957). In this article it was further observed that:
Neither the compensatory nor the punitive theory offers a complete
explanation of the law of torts; a full explanation requires reference
to both. Normally the amount of damages is measured by the harm
to the plaintiff-the compensatory theory explains this fact. But if
only compensatory damages are permitted the punitive function of
tort law may not be served .... Thus, exemplary damages promote
one of the two primary purposes of tort law by allowing additional
flexibility for admonition, so that the punishment may be roughly
adjusted to the offender.
Id. at 524.
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prosecute. The contention that the failure of the criminal law to
punish when it ought to should be remedied by improving the
administration of criminal justice rather than by providing
'bounties' at the expense of the tort-feasor" is sheer sophistry.
Moreover, it overlooks the verity that corporate entities cannot be
jailed and that the rigidity inherent in the maximum fine which
might be imposed by the criminal law is ill-tailored to achieve effec-
tive deterrence.
The punitive function of compensatory damages does not, in
itself, however, adequately and consistently provide the deterrence
afforded by exemplary awards."0 In situations where the tort-feasor,
in undertaking an unsafe mode of conduct, has factored in the
cost of reparations to victims, compensatory damages alone have
no deterrent value; only exemplary awards can consistently pro-
vide this desired prophylaxis.
II. SOME CRITICISMS OF THE DOCTRINE
Despite the widespread acceptance of the doctrine of exemplary
awards and its sound justification as an implement of the civil law,
the doctrine has also been criticized as being unconstitutional;
as beyond the competence of juries to administer;-, and as causing
calendar congestion."
Its claimed unconstitutionality revolves around arguments that
awarding differing amounts, depending upon the wealth of the
tort-feasor, violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
" Duffy, Punitive Damages, A Doctrine Which Should be Abolished, DE-
FENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE MONOGRAPH: THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES
4, 12 (1969).
'old. at 11.
31 See, e.g., Ford, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, DEFENSE RE-
SEARCH INSTITUTE MONOGRAPH: THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 15
(1969).
2 See, e.g., Silliman, Punitive Damages Related to Multiple Litigation Against
a Corporation, 16 FED. INS. COUNSEL Q. 91 (1966).
"s See, e.g., Anderson, Indemnity Against Punitive Damages: An Examination
of Punitive Damages, Their Purpose, Public Policy, and the Coverage Provisions
of Texas Standard Automobile Liability Policy, 27 Sw. L.J. 593 (1973).
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Amendment; ' that such awards violate the due process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in that the prescribed con-
duct and sanctions are not clearly defined,' and that the tort-
feasor, in violation of these amendments, may be compelled to
testify against himself;"0 that the defendant tort-feasor is deprived
of the right to be confronted by his accusers in violation of the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments;"7 that such awards are imposed
on a mere preponderance of the evidence rather than on proof
beyond a reasonable doubt as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments;" and that exemplary awards may violate the double-
jeopardy provision of the Constitution."'
The underlying thesis of these constitutional attacks appears to
be that a "definitional identity" and policy similarity between
criminal conduct and tortious conduct warranting the imposition
of exemplary awards drags the latter within the ambit of the con-
stitutional protections surrounding the former." The "definitional
identity" relied on is the mens rea required for criminality and
for conduct warranting the imposition of an exemplary award.
The thesis is unsound, however, in that the policy considerations
which underlie criminal sanctions are not similar to those which
underlie exemplary awards. In reviewing these policy considera-
tions, it has been observed:
Basically the criminal proceeding is to punish the defendant for a
past offense, whereas in cases of fraud, malice, gross negligence, or
oppression, the interest of society and of the aggrieved individual
are blended and exemplary damages are allowed as an example or
warning to deter them from committing like offenses in the future."'
This salient distinction was observed in Helvering v. Mitchell, 303
U.S. 391 (1938). In Mitchell a claim was made that a proceeding
to collect a tax penalty was barred by the double-jeopardy pro-
" Ford, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, DEFENSE RESEARCH IN-
STITUTE MONOGRAPH: THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 15, 20 (1969).
Id. at 21.
S"Id. at 18-20.
" Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119 (1884).
"Ford, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, DEFENSE RESEARCH IN-
STITUTE MONOGRAPH: THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 15, 18-19 (1969).
"Id. at 21-22.
40 Id. at 15-18.
41 Pratt v. Dock, 28 Tenn. App. 266, 191 S.W.2d 562, 565 (1945).
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vision of the Fifth Amendment. The party from whom the penalty
was being sought had previously been prosecuted for tax evasion
arising out of the same facts as the penalty litigation. The court
articulated the standard that: "Unless this sanction was intended
as punishment, so that the proceeding is essentially criminal, the
double jeopardy clause provided for the defendant in criminal
prosecutions is not applicable."' The Mitchell court then went on
to observe the proceeding to collect the penalty was remedial and
not criminal in nature and, therefore, refused to recognize the
constitutional defense.'
More than one hundred years ago, in response to a constitutional
attack, the Supreme Court set forth language which still appears
to be germane today:
It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in actions
of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict
what are called exemplary, punitive or vindictive changes upon a
defendant, having in view the enormity of his offense rather than
the measure of the compensation to the plaintiff. We are aware
that the propriety of the doctrine has been questioned by some
writers; but if repeated judicial decisions for more than a century
are to be received as the best exposition of what the law is, the
question will not admit argument."
More succinctly, it has been observed "the constitutionality of
punitive damages' generally is sustained by ample precedent."' "
Following these constitutional arguments, the contention that
the doctrine of exemplary awards is beyond the ability of juries to
administer must be considered. Apparently, the reasoning is that
juries are devoid of sufficient common sense to measure the quan-
"Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
43Mitchell did not create this distinction, but merely recognized it as one
which had long existed. See, e.g., Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630 (1926).
Another distinction which has been made is that although both criminal sanc-
tions and exemplary awards may entail punitive aspects, criminal sanctions are
addressed to wrongs done to the public, whereas exemplary awards are addressed
to wrongs done to the individual. Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 12 Iowa 380 (1866).
"Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851).
'Herald Co. v. Harper, 293 F. Supp. 1101, 1105 (E.D. Mo. 1968), afl'd,
410 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1969). Accord, Curtiss Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967). The doctrine has similarly been held not to violate state constitutions.
See, e.g., Svejcara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1971);
Soucy v. Greyhound Corp., 27 App. Div. 2d 112, 276 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1967);
Hartman v. Logan, 203 S.W. 61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
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tum of the award to deter anti-social behavior. What has been
observed by a court in a similar situation concerning an analogous
attack on our jury system applies here as well: "we must as-
sume that a jury will follow the instructions and correctly decide
the issues presented." To the extent the jury fails to properly ful-
fill its function, its findings, like its findings on any other matter,
are subject to tempering and correction by appellate review. This,
rather than abolition of this "worthy legacy of our common law,"'
seems to be the more reasoned approach.
Finally, the argument that the doctrine of exemplary awards
causes crowding of court calendars and should presumably be
abolished for this reason must be rejected as being predicated on
the erroneous thesis that actions in which exemplary awards are
sought in addition to compensatory damages would not have been
instituted to recover compensatory damages alone. Surely, actions
seeking exemplary awards will add somewhat to the court calen-
dars; so does criminal law. Should both be abolished to truncate
calendars?
III. THE LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER FOR EXEMPLARY AWARDS
DUE TO THE TORTIOUS CONDUCT OF ITS EMPLOYEES
A perplexing problem exists as to whether employers should be
vicariously liable for exemplary awards because of tortious con-
duct of employees and, if so, under what circumstances. At the
outset it should be noted this problem involves corporate as well
as individual employers, inasmuch as the doctrine of exemplary
awards applies equally to both.' At one end of the spectrum, it
46 Price v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 16 Ariz. App. 511, 494 P.2d
711, 714 (1972). In Price, the court was confronted with the contention that the
jury was unable to distinguish between ordinary and gross negligence.
4 TSee, e.g., Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 2d 450, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 416 (1974); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689,
711, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). The doctrine of exemplary awards applied initially
solely to individuals but was later extended to corporations. Spellman v. Rich-
mond & D.R. Co., 35 S.C. 475, 477, 14 S.E. 947, 949 (1892). Perhaps slightly
overstated, but basically correct, was the attitude of the court in Goddard v.
The Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 57 Me. 202 (1869), toward corporations wherein
the court said:
Under cover of the [corporate name] and authority, there is in fact
as much wickedness, and as much that is deserving of punishment,
as can be found anywhere else. And since these ideal existences
can neither be hung, imprisoned, whipped, or put in stocks . . .
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has been urged that employers should be exempt from vicariously
imposed exemplary awards' and, on the other, that employers
should respond merely on evidence establishing the employee was
acting within the scope of his employment and nothing more."
Arguments against the vicarious imposition of exemplary awards
include the logic that the deterrent effect of exemplary awards will
be greatly enhanced if the employer were immune but the em-
ployee, director or officer alone were called on to individually
satisfy the exemplary award."0 This logic is faulty, however, in that
it overlooks the already existing exposure of the employee to pay
any exemplary award even when the employer is similarly vulner-
able. It also overlooks the difficulty inherent in attempting to assure
that corporate funds, through one device or another, are not
channelled to the offending employee to satisfy this obligation,
the doctrine of exemplary damages is more beneficial in its appli-
cation to them, than in its application to natural persons .... There
is but one vulnerable point about . . . corporations; and that is,
the pocket of moneyed power that is concealed behind them; and
if that is reached they will wince. When it is thoroughly understood
that it is not profitable to employ careless or indifferent agents,
or wreckless and insolent servants, better men will take their places,
and not before.
Id. at 224.
The propriety of imposing exemplary awards, where appropriate, on corporate
entities cannot be discredited by the argument that when such awards are imposed
on a corporation, they are unjustifiably assessed, in reality, against innocent
shareholders whose power over corporate -management is both legally and effec-
tively limited. Such argument has indeed been advanced. Silliman, Punitive Dam-
ages Related to Multiple Litigation Against a Corporation, 16 FED. INS. COUNSEL
Q. 91, 92 (1966). Shareholders select management and, therefore, do have effec-
tive control over management. Moreover, it is the shareholders who receive the
benefits of managerial decisions. It is difficult to understand why, within the
framework of the limited liability as shareholders, they should not be held to
the maxim noblesse oblige.
"'Notes and Comments, The Assessment of Punitive Damages Against an
Entrepreneur for the Malicious Torts of his Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1296
(1961). In this article an exception was carved out, nevertheless, for the "rare
case in which the malicious tort was authorized for the specific purpose of en-
hancing corporate profits." Id. at 1310.
4'See, e.g., Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir.
1964); Southern Pac. Co. v. Barnes, 3 Ariz. App. 483, 415 P.2d 579 (1966);
Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 251 Ark. 1036, 479 S.W.2d 518 (1972); Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Johns, 269 So. 2d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Tietjens v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 418 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1967); Sandifer Oil Co. v. Dew, 220
Miss. 609, 71 So. 2d 752 (1954).
"°Notes and Comments, The Assessment of Punitive Damages Against an
Entrepreneur for the Malicious Torts of his Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1296,
1309-10 (1961).
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especially where the employee enjoys a position in the corpora-
tion's upper echelon.
Another argument against vicarious liability for exemplary
awards is that imposition of this sanction on an employer who is
not at fault cannot be justified on the theory of spreading loss to
the party who can best pay (which is the primary justification
for vicariously awarding compensatory damage against an em-
ployer). The thrust of this argument is persuasive only if it can be
demonstrated no other reasoning equally justifies imposing lia-
bility, under these circumstances, on an employer. The most com-
monly encountered argument for vicariously imposing exemplary
awards on employers for employee's acts is the prophylactic one
of inducing employers to more carefully screen and supervise em-
ployees." This justification has been criticized, perhaps correctly
so, in many cases, however, as being "absurd in light of present
day employment practices, union contracts.
Mindful that the quintessential justification for imposing ex-
emplary awards is deterrence, the better approach would appear
to be to impose such awards on employers only when such deter-
rence can be effectively brought to bear. Such instances would
include occasions when the corporation itself participated in the
tortious conduct because of the elevated position of the employee
in the employer's organization,"3 or the employer authorized or
5 See, e.g., Goddard v. The Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 57 Me. 202 (1869).
2 Ghiardi, The Case Against Punitive Damages, 8 FORUM 411, 420 (1972);
See also Notes and Comments, The Assessment of Punitive Damages Against an
Entrepreneur for the Malicious Torts of His Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1296,
1304 (1961); Duffy, Punitive Damages, A Doctrine Which Should be Abolished,
DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE MONOGRAPH: THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES 4, 13 (1969). Other, less persuasive arguments have also been advanced,
among them that imposition of vicarious liability for exemplary awards will
lead to less care because employees, recognizing that their diligence will go
unrewarded, will abstain from policing the employees or merely be content to
insurance against this exposure. Notes and Comments, The Assessment of Puni-
tive Damages Against an Entrepreneur for the Malicious Torts of His Employees,
70 YALE L.J. 1296, 1301-03 (1961). Certainly, one cannot assume employers
will stand idly by any more to the threat of vicariously imposed liability for
exemplary damages than they do to the threat of vicariously imposed liability
for compensatory damages.
3 Lake Shore & M.S.R.R. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1892); United States
Steel Corp. v. Fulman, 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1969); Parris v. St. Johnsbury
Trucking Co., 395 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1968); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 273 F. Supp.
870 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Petition of Den Norske Amerikalinje A/S, 276 F. Supp.
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ratified the employee's conduct," or the employer's conduct itself
in selecting or retaining the employee warranted the imposition
directly on the employer.'
IV. INDEMNIFICATION, THROUGH INSURANCE,
FOR EXEMPLARY AWARDS
An area of increasing concern for defendants, potential defend-
ants and their insurers is whether the standard liability insurance
policy affords indemnification against exemplary awards. This
especially sensitive area often pits insured against insurer, often-
times with the insurer disclaiming coverage for the largest part of
the insured's exposure.
The insured's hurdles to assuring it has coverage for exemplary
awards are twofold: first, whether such coverage is within the
terms of the policy and, second, whether the contract which pro-
vides such coverage contravenes public policy and is, therefore,
unenforceable."' This paper will discuss the latter hurdle and defer
to the legal scions of the insurance industry to discourse on the
former (as one must assume they will be eager to do.)"'
As to the public policy hurdle, two situations arise: the first,
163 (N.D. Ohio 1967); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 399
(Ct. App. 1967); Goetz v. Security Indus. Bank, 508 P.2d 410 (Colo. Ct. App.
1973); Dart Drug, Inc. v. Linthecium, 300 A.2d 442 (D.C. 1973); Barlow v.
Int'l Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 522 P.2d 1102 (1974); Fredenburgh v. Allied
Van Lines, 79 N.M. 593, 446 P.2d 868 (1968); Sierra Blanca Sales Co. v. New
Industries, Inc., 88 N.M. 472, 542 P.2d 52 (Ct. App. 1975); Osborn v. Gene
Teague Chevrolet Co., 459 P.2d 988 (Or. 1969); Int'l Security Life Ins. Co. v.
Finck, 496 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. 1973).
"'See, e.g., Fort v. White, 530 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1976); Hale v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 42 Cal. App. 3d 681, 117 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Ct. App. 1975); Curtis v.
Siebrand Circus & Carnival Co., 68 Idaho 285, 194 P.2d 281 (1948); Gindin v.
Baron, 16 N.J. Super. 1, 83 A.2d 790 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951); Sanchez v.
Sec. Acceptance Corp., 57 N.M. 512, 260 P.2d 703 (1953); Curry v. Big Bears
Store Co., 31 Ohio App. 340, 142 N.E.2d 684 (1956); Tri-State Coach Corp.
v. Walsh, 188 Va. 299, 49 S.E.2d 363 (1948); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 217C(a)(d) (1955).
" See, e.g., Addair v. Huffman, 195 S.E.2d 739 (W.Va. 1973); Hyde v.
Baggett Transp. Co., 236 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Tenn. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 217C(b) (1955).
6' Some courts have upheld coverage relying solely on contract interpretation
and ignoring the public policy consideration entirely. See, e.g., Pennsylvania
Thresherman & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th
Cir. 1957); United States Fid. & Guarantee Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D.
Cal. 1943); Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965).
5'See, e.g., Conley & Bishop, 25 FED. INS. CoUNSEL Q. 309, 314-18 (1975).
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where the party seeking indemnification is' only vicariously liable,
and the second, where the party was the active tort-feasor. In the
former situation, where, for example, an employer is liable solely
on the basis of respondeat superior, it has been held that indemni-
fication does not violate public policy." On the other hand, where
the party seeking indemnification is an active tort-feasor, policy
arguments regarding indemnification diverge. Some jurisdictions
hold that indemnification, under these circumstances, contravenes
public policy because it thwarts deterrence and results in the im-
position of the award, not on the tort-feasor, but on innocent par-
ties, such as consumers or other insureds to whom the obligation
of paying is ultimately distributed through insurance premium
costs."
68 See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Reichard, 404 F.2d 868 (5th Cir.
1968); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934),
cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 261 So. 2d 545
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. U.S. Fire
Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105
Ill. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969); LoRocco v. N.J. Mfrs. Indem. Ins.
Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323, 197 A.2d 591 (1964); Esmond v. Liscia, 209 Pa. Super.
Ct. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966). Judicial attitude to the indemnification issue for
a defendant vicariously liable for an exemplary award has been expressed thusly:
Since we have permitted punitive damages to be assessed against
an employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior even in the
absence of the employer's knowledge or authorization of the em-
ployee's acts, we can perceive of no good reason why an employer
should be prohibited from insuring himself against such losses,
since the losses are in effect a business loss-i.e. a calculated risk
of doing business.
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 851, 440 S.W.2d
582, 584 (1969).
"American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966); Northwestern
Nat. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962); Ohio Cas. Co. v. Wel-
fare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935);
Ging v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 293 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Fla. 1968); Amer-
ican Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257 (D. Conn. 1965); Price v. Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co., 208 Ariz. 485, 508 P.2d 522 (1972); Southern Farm Bureau
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 970, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969); Brown v. West-
ern Cas. & Surety Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Tedesco v. Md.
Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 257 (1941); Nicholson v. American Fire &
Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Guardianship of Estate
of Smith, 211 Kan. 397, 507 P.2d 189 (1973); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17
(Mo. Ct. App. 1964); LoRocco v. N.J. Mfrs. Indem. Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super.
323, 197 A.2d 591 (1964); Padavan v. Clemente, 43 App. Div. 2d 729, 350
N.Y.S.2d 694 (1973); Esmond v. Liscia, 209 Pa. Super. Ct. 200, 224 A.2d 793
(1966).
With reference to thwarting the deterrent function of the award, it has been
observed "with respect to the remaining states, those holding to the orthodox
view that the sole purposes of punitive damages are punishment and deterrence,
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The better view, however, is that indemnification does not vio-
late public policy in those few jurisdictions which view the func-
tion of such awards as compensatory and may not violate public
policy in those jurisdictions which view the function of such awards
as deterrence. As to those jurisdictions which view the function as
compensatory, it is difficult to see how public policy can be
thwarted by assuring a fund to assure compensation.0
With respect to jurisdictions which view deterrence as the pri-
mary purpose of exemplary awards, to the extent persons or
organizations other than the defendant are deterred by the example
of an exemplary award, public policy is not violated but rather
is served by the existence of insurance which provided the funds
which induced the plaintiff to seek the award. Moreover, it must
be kept in mind that payment of an exemplary award is not the
only consequence of being sued for such an award. Another con-
sequence is the inconvenience and business disruption incurred by
and in no event compensation, the reasoning of Judge Wisdom in McNulty
[Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962)] is in-
escapable." In commenting on the argument that it was doubtful that closing
the insurance market on the payment of exemplary awards would actually deter
reckless and wanton conduct, the court in American Surety Co. v. Gold, 375
F.2d 523, 527 (10th Cir. 1966), wrote:
This argument seems to miss the mark, for we may as well say
criminal sanctions serve no useful purpose just because they are
constantly violated. The question is not so much the efficacy of
the policy underlying punitive damages; rather it is a question of
the implementation of that policy. Permitting the penalty for the
misdeed to be levied on one other than he who committed it cannot
possibly implement the policy.
With reference to the reasoning that a tort-feasor ought not to pass off his
obligation to pay an exemplary award by insuring against it, it has been observed
that "a person has no right to expect the law to allow him to place responsibility
for his wreckless and wanton acts on someone else," Nicholson v. American Fire
& Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965), and
it seems only just that the burden of paying punitive damages
should rest ultimately, as well as nominally, on the party who
actually committed the wrong. If the defendant Gleb was permitted
to shift to garnishee the burden of the punitive damage award, then
the award would have served no purpose. Plaintiff would have al-
ready been made whole through his compensatory damages, and
the insurance company, which had done no wrong, would be pun-
ished.
Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
60 In his article, The Validity of Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages-
An Unresolved Question?, 4 N. MEX. L. REv. 65, 67-68 (1973), Bruce D. Hall
wrote and, quite correctly so, "if compensation is an objective, no public policy
is offended by permitting the plaintiff to collect the damages from the tort-feasor's
insurer."
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a defendant's having to defend against a claim for an exemplary
award. This burden is particularly apparent when the insurer has
conceded liability and agreed to pay compensatory damages, which
would normally dispose of the litigation, but does not dare make
such a concession as to claims for exemplary awards. Another
aspect, totally separate from payment, is the imposition on a de-
fendant of being compelled to allow plaintiff's counsel to probe the
fiscal deterrent factors, all resulting from the fact that plaintiff was
proper amount of the exemplary award. These cumulative non-
fiscal deterrent factors, all resulting from the fact that plaintiff was
induced to seek the exemplary award because it was funded by
insurance should not be ignored before pronouncing judgment in
the indemnification issue."1
V. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The vitality of the doctrine of exemplary awards depends not
only on its ability to fulfill its deterrent function, but also on its
measured restraint. Should overkill be the consistent result of the
doctrine's application, legislative intervention may be anticipated.
Jurors who are called on to apply the doctrine should be clearly
apprised that its only function is deterrence and that punishment
and revenge, in themselves, are not its purpose. Moreover, the
judiciary should strive to promulgate a clear set of guidelines re-
garding what evidence is admissible to enable the jury to realize
the doctrine's deterrent function and formulate for itself a set of
effective rules to enable the doctrine to fulfill this function."
a' General Casualty Co. of America v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir.
1956); Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934),
cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935); Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Co. v. Dan-
iel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters
Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1964); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall-
gren, 34 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
62Indeed, it has been aptly observed that:
This problem will be dealt with to the limit of human ingenuity
only when the study of actual life as affected by law suits results
in the invention (discovery?) of rules which will aid in the satis-
factory determination of the severity of punitive damage verdicts.
It is believed that the only hope for individualization which will
"work," lies in a system based on thought and observation, and
expressed in words which make it available for the tort court in
action. Without such a system, individualization is at best an op-
portunity to muddle through complicated situations on unorganized
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Inasmuch as any plaintiff who includes a claim for an exemplary
award does so seeking to deter anti-social conduct not for himself
alone but for the community in general, it seems that proceeds
from such awards should be dedicated, at least partially, to the
common good. This is particularly true in aviation cases where the
altruistic motives of plaintiffs who institute claims for exemplary
awards could be given full expression by using portions of the
awards to further aviation safety. This is not to suggest, however,
that plaintiffs be denied the opportunity of participating in any
part of such awards; to countenance such a denial would surely
lead to the abandonment of this socially beneficial instrumentation
of the common law. That we can ill afford.
Where the single act of a defendant causes, multiple injuries or
deaths as, for example, in a single air crash, the measure of the
defendant should be taken but once and the tort-feasor should not
and scanty knowledge, and at worst a potentiality of dealing with
each case as the caprice of judge and jury dictates.
Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1190 (1931).
Some effort has been made to formulate some rules to tailor the award to
the function of the doctrine. For example, some jurisdictions have adopted a
rule requiring that some reasonable relationship exist between actual damages
and the exemplary award. See, e.g., Luke v. Mercantile Acceptance Corp., 111
Cal. App. 2d 431, 244 P.2d 764 (1952); McNeil v. Allen, 534 P.2d 813 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1975); Reynolds v. Willis, Del, 209 A.2d 760 (1965); Wisner v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 465 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d
354 (Utah 1975), and others have adopted a rule requiring that a ratio exist
between actual damages and exemplary awards. See, e.g., Johnson Publishing
Co. v. Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 124 So. 2d 441 (1960); Malco, Inc. v. Midwest
Aluminum Sales, Inc., 14 Wis. 2d 57, 109 N.W.2d 516 (1961). Both the reason-
able relationship rule and the ration rule are misguided, however. As to the rea-
sonable relationship rule, it has been observed that "any test which requires a
relationship between actual damages and punitive damages disregards the obvious
fact that the amount of ascertainable injury is no barometer of the degree of
malice entertained by the defendant," Jacoby, The Relationship of Punitive Dam-
ages and Compensatory Damages in Tort Actions, 75 DICKENSON L. REV. 585,
591 (1971), and that "flexibility of admonition should not be vitiated by adher-
ing to a 'reasonable relation' test." Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 531 (1957). The ratio test has drawn similar fire:
The ratio requirement diverts attention from the nature of the de-
fendant's conduct and from the need to discourage similar conduct
in the future. By focusing attention on the specific harm that re-
sulted from the defendant's conduct, a ratio requirement points to
a false guide for effective punishment and results in an injustice.
Walter, The Reasonable Ratio Between Exemplary and Actual Damages in Texas,
10 Hous. L. REv. 131, 137 (1972).
EXEMPLARY AWARDS
be subject to multiple exemplary awards." When, on the other
hand, a defendant acts repeatedly in a grossly negligent manner or
in a manner evidencing careless disregard for the safety of others,
there should be no hesitancy in making award upon award until the
message of deterrence has been successfully brought home.
Nor should the fact that there are many victims be used as a reason to avoid
making any exemplary award at all. Such was, in essence, the approach taken
by the court in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
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